Assessing Responses to the US Monkeypox Outbreak
On August 4th, the Biden Administration declared a Public Health Emergency (PHE) regarding the ongoing Monkeypox outbreak in the United States and other countries where the virus is not endemic. Two days prior, the White House announced a National response Team, lead by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Robert Fenton and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Dr. Demetre Daskalakis.
Bob Fenton holds some notoriety at FEMA, in part, because in 2005, while helping to coordinate on-the-ground responses to Hurricane Katrina’s devastation, he warned officials in Washington, D.C. that more needed to be done to meet the needs of the moment. Dr. Demetre Daskalakis has been credited with helping to curb and end a measles outbreak in 2018 and 2019 in New York City, prior to joining the CDC, but more aptly, his extraordinary efforts in 2014 to end the meningitis outbreak by bringing vaccines to bath houses, dressing in drag, and otherwise successfully bringing care to communities and people who needed it. With these histories, there’s no wondering why the White House selected these two professionals to lead this response. And having well-qualified leaders with excellent analytical skills and histories of putting success strategies into action aren’t necessarily going to be enough.
In a protracted opinion published to The New York Times, a former U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) lead, Scott Gottlieb, accurately assessed a lack of political appetite to allocate more power and funding into public health. Specifically, Gottlieb argued the CDC has failed to compel a more coordinated response from state level partners, despite a very evident need to make these kinds of investments to shore up the country’s preparedness and ability to respond to health threats. The Biden Administration has instead suggested a need to make more agencies, which may be a way of trying to get around that lack of appetite and still achieve some measure of these investments. This type of move is, as Gottlieb described, a “very Washington response”, from both the short-sightedness of the legislator-politicians tasked with serving the best interests of the country’s populous and the Biden Administration’s fumbling response. He is correct in saying monkeypox, like other viruses foreign to the United States, may well become yet another public health failure. However, Gottlieb also argued the delayed or at least slow federal response to this monkeypox outbreak showed a need for the CDC to get out of the business of preventing illnesses other than infectious diseases and leave that work to other agencies. A gentle reminder, “Prevention” is in the name of the agency and adding layers of bureaucracy will not fix the fact that existing bureaucracy just…isn’t working as fast or efficiently as we need it to in order to respond to public health emergencies.
Those politically powerful voices, like Mr. Gottlieb’s, with influence must push the conversation with their audiences, especially political leadership, to draw a line in the sand in the interests of the nation. The more any party leadership is willing or even happy to promote inflammatory, conspiracy minded, and objectively false claims, especially those around issues of public health, just to win elections, the less power our federal government will have to respond to emergencies and the less states will be willing to cooperate when cooperation is needed.
Of the notable assessments Gottlieb offers, the most meaningful are drawing a potential definition of “public health failure” as monkeypox becoming an endemic virus to the United States in which persistent but low-level of the virus continues to circulate. Another is the potential of an “ascertainment” bias, but not the one most folks discussing this issue might jump to first – regarding communication around at-risk populations – but that this outbreak may seem like it “appeared out of nowhere”. Instead, it has likely been circulating undetected for some time and misdiagnosed or assumed as some other illness among health care professionals. Given the genomic distinctions discovered shortly after the initial detection of cases in Europe and North America, there’s good evidence to support that conclusion; a conclusion that lends great concern for that definition of “public health failure” to be accurate.
On the more technical analyses regarding this outbreak, a lack of precise, effective communication and a willingness for the public to accept complex realities has plagued federal, state, and local health agencies. Arguments between well-intentioned advocates, journalists, and public health professionals on effective messaging have enveloped the discussion around Monkeypox, flooding and fueling social media speculation and concerns of misinformation. Indeed, maliciously intended politicians, like Representative (GA-R) Marjorie Taylor Greene’s repeated statements (which will not be linked here as readers can Google search these things) equating the rare Monkeypox cases being reported among children are some evidence of sexual assault being perpetuated by men who have sex with men, were among the fears voiced on these platforms in June.
Public health agencies are looking to perform a balancing act in ensuring the resources, including vaccines and treatments, are reaching the most highly affected communities, while also educating and informing the public at large when addressing a unique outbreak where clinical information on transmission risks is limited, even as data is becoming more readily available. To be clear, the current global outbreak of monkeypox is concentrated among the social-sexual networks of men who have sex with men (including transgender men). Messaging and resource allocation are two very different things and should not be treated as one in the same. And educational messaging must be carefully tailored to its intended audience in order to not perpetuate stigma and the violence that can result from stigma. Indeed, issues of stigma, violence, and even public policy already suppressed investigation around a previous monkeypox outbreak in Nigeria, which may have better prepared the world for preventing this one. As Dr. MK Titanji pointed out, part of this previous disinvestment and lack of investigation is a direct result of the fact that half of the world’s countries criminalizing homosexuality are within the African continent, some of which are the only countries in the world where monkeypox is already endemic.
Critically important, stigma and other factors which perpetuate health disparities are already finding familiar lines in the United States. The CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Report Weekly (MMWR), published on August 5th, found that even in the limited data available, "The percentage of cases among Black persons increased from 12% (29 of 248) during May 17–July 2 to 31%." Additionally, for those cases with full profiles, 41% of cases were among MSM living with HIV. The confounding factor to consider with that high rate of HIV prevalence among monkeypox cases is thanks to robust, though certainly not perfect, public health infrastructure specifically in response to HIV, people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) may be more able to readily access health care professionals who are aware and educated about this monkeypox outbreak than other populations. The press conference immediately following the declaration of public health emergency had federal officials discussing a “vaccine sparing” strategy in order to facilitate reaching more people in need. However, given this concentration of case identification among PLWHA and that the available vaccines may not be as effective for this population, there’s good reason for patients and advocates to be concerned what dose sparring may mean for the most impacted population.
As this situation develops, we’re lucky to have the expertise the White House has engaged, who have readily sought out community feedback and engagement. As an example, Harold Philips, the Director of the Office of National AIDS Policy (ONAP), has had subsequent conversations with stakeholders in HIV to discuss leveraging the HIV infrastructure in order to help address this outbreak. And there’s much left unknown, including what exactly the risk is to children who may be in close, consistent, physical contact with people who have been diagnosed with monkeypox. Advocates are already coming together from across jurisdictions in an effort to appropriately influence public policy and program designs. Our efficacy in that work and in coordinating a response based in best practices of meaningful engagement means our private industry stakeholders must also support us in this work.
Additional reading which may be beneficial: From our friends over at the Center for Disaster Philanthropy; Monkeypox Briefing, including suggestions to funders in supporting advocacy and services to address the outbreak.
