CMS Sides with the Devil: Insurers’ Co-Pay Accumulators Remain…for Now

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) was revolutionary in how prescriptive statutory language was in ensuring health insurers (payers) covered costs associated with pre-existing conditions, if they accepted even a penny of federal funding. The trade off was a simple theory: “cover more people and their entire health and we’ll make sure you’re still profitable”. There were hundreds of pages of caveats, definitions, incentives for public programs, pharmaceutical research, and regulatory authority passed to state and federal agencies. Everyone got a piece of the pie to the end benefit of Americans for whom health care had been out of reach for the majority of their lives. We would be healthier together by simply providing people the care we need and reducing overall costs. However, as these things go, payers are creative and pay their lawyers handsomely to find ways around that basic agreement. As payers fight to “contain costs”, co-pay accumulator programs are one of the most disingenuous methods to limit consumer access to quality care and pad payers profit margins.

From issues of discriminatory plan design, or making consumers pay the highest cost-sharing for medications which are only used to treat certain conditions like HIV, to limiting provider networks in such a way that a patient requiring a surgery or emergency care results in surprise bills to toxic practices known as “utilization management” (including, but not limited to, abusive prior authorizations and step therapy, also known as “fail first”), payers have paid their lawyers quite well to find loopholes or design new problems in order to maintain their profits. The ACA’s medical loss ratio (MLR) rule, also known as 80-20/85-15 rule (in general requiring 80% or 85% of a plans premiums to actually be used on costs of care or pay back to balance to consumers) has resulted in a startling 2 billion dollars to be paid back to consumers in 2019 alone. But the rule doesn’t necessarily count other income payers can produce by way of cost-sharing or deductible payments, co-pays (a fixed price typically paid after deductibles are met for care and medications), and – now, more commonly – “co-insurance” (a percentage price typically paid after deductibles are met for care and medications) as part of that rule. The result is consumers and those who would like to see us get the quality, individualized care we need are being put on the hook for payers’ greed.

Patient advocacy often has interesting bedfellows. And at the intersection of our care interests and that of industry, pharmaceutical manufacturers have found what can arguably described as a somewhat socialist model by way of patient assistance programs, often enacted as co-pay card or discount programs aimed at directly benefiting patients by taking care of the patients’ share of a medication’s cost. These programs are quite frequently limited by income or if a person is insured. The idea being to make sure the most costly medications make their way into the hands of the people who need them most and can least afford them. In this, our interests as patients absolutely converge with that of manufacturers. We want quality therapies made available to us. However, when a medication “goes generic”, often these programs are no longer available as a less costly, generic medication is preferred by the payer unless a patient fails that particular medication (see: step therapy, “fail-first”). The problem is generic medications are not held to extraordinarily strict requirements for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval that brand name medications are held to. Indeed, earlier this year, Vice offered a fantastic explanation of the problem with preferencing generic medications by payers (both public and private) is harmful to patients and why our generics “approval” process is a threat to the health and safety of patients. It’s no wonder, with the lax oversight of generic medications and the offer of payment assistance from manufacturers that patients would want access brand name and newer medications on the market.

One of the most amazing benefits of patient assistance programs is, in theory, because they’re meant to cover the patient’s cost-sharing obligations, these out-of-pocket (OOP) costs should apply to the patient’s deductible and OOP maximums and reduce the cost burden to patients for future care throughout the plan year. Right?

Wrong.

Payers have near uniformly adopted a practice known as “accumulator adjustment programs”, or co-pay accumulators, in which a payer basically says to a patient and a manufacturer “all for me, none for thee”, taking the entirety of the benefit offered by a patient assistance program and not crediting the patient with those funds received against the patient’s deductible, co-pay or co-insurance, or out-of-pocket maximums. To boot, manufacturers have zero control over this practice and often don’t know when it’s happening until a patient complains about the experience. Payers justify this move as “cost-containment” and disincentivizing patients from seeking more costly medications – which translates to newer, more effective, safer medications (go back to the problem with generic approvals above).

So far, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the primary authority in which payment rules are issued from the federal government to payers, have generally made extraordinary effort to ensure protect the interests of patients and those who align with our interest. In the instance of CMS’s newest rebate rule, CMS chose to side with payers for some inexplicable reason. The rule states pharmaceutical manufacturers, not payers, would have to count these direct-to-consumer assistance programs among “best price” calculations, which govern Medicaid rebate price setting or what the government pays for a medication, if a patient didn’t receive 100% of the benefit of the assistance program. Previous rules on what to consider in calculating “best price” were generally limited to prices negotiated within industry movers inside the supply chain, not that of end users. The theory goes like this: “if ultimately this assistance program is paying an insurer’s bottom line and not helping patients, then it should be considered a price you (manufacturers’) negotiated. You were planning for that in setting your prices anyways, right?” Pop quiz answer: wonky negotiations with payers is not what manufacturers were planning on in designing income limited, only-accessible-by-consumers-asking for-it assistance programs. The solution CMS offered was for manufacturers to ensure patients received the intended benefit by requiring patients to pay for a medication up front and then ask for reimbursement – a process that only makes medication access and affordability infinitely more complicated and burdensome for patients.

In the end, CMS decided that in response to an excessively abusive payer practice that disadvantages patients, the answer was to create further barriers to accessing care for patients rather than to reduce them.

Let’s make this real and “back of the envelope” this practice in terms of realized patient experiences:

Monthly Income: $2,583 (based on average US income in 2019 provided by the Census Bureau)
Monthly premium: $304 (lowest cost local silver deductible is $3,400, OOP maximum is $8550, co-insurance is 20-40%)

Absent a public payer intervention, co-pay accumulators might allow a patient assistance program to cover the estimated $600 per month co-insurance would demand for a certain medication, however, I’m not likely to meet my deductible or maximum OOP for the year at all. With local rent costing about $1000 per month, a car payment and car insurance in order to work (there’s no meaningful public transit in the vast majority of the country), food costs, utilities, etc. Even with federal subsidies provided via the health care market place, every month, I’m in the negative. Which means I can’t afford to see my doctor or get my quarterly labs, which means I can’t get my medication in the first place.

However, without the application of a co-pay accumulator, accessing just 3 month’s worth of a patient assistance program would meet my deductible and maximum OOP costs for the year. I don’t have to worry about at least $200 per month in medical costs. And one less financial strain is off my shoulders.

For the vast majority of us, our medications are not a luxury item. They’re not something we can afford to pay for up front and mail-in a rebate request and wait months for. In doing so, CMS not only suggests an increase to the paperwork burden on patients and manufacturers alike, CMS also seeks to increase barriers to accessing life saving medications to begin with.

All to the benefit (read: profit) of payers. So it’s no wonder the trade organizations, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) chose to initiate a lawsuit to halt the implementation of CMS’s backwards and punitive rule.

While patient advocates may spar readily about the role of industry among advocates, we should also recognize actions that align with our own interests on their face. Yes, PhRMA may be leading up this suit - and CMS should listen to the needs of patients, reverse course, and voluntarily pull this rule.